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Peace-and-Order Power of an Ohio
Municipal Corporation
by Louis B. Perillo*
B Y AUTHORITY OF THE CONSTITUTION of 1851, and prior to the
constitutional convention of 1912, the ordinance-making
powers of Ohio municipal corporations were derived from legis-
lative enactments of the General Assembly. The state was the
sovereignty and the municipality was the agent or "arm of
sovereignty" to carry out the general purposes of the state. The
municipal corporation possessed those police powers which were
expressly granted by statute, and those which could be reason-
ably implied as necessary to carry into effect those expressly
granted.' The power to preserve and maintain the "good order
and peace" was only one facet of those powers.
In the early, but leading, case of Morgan v. Nolte,2 a local
ordinance, providing for the apprehension of any person who was
a known thief, and unable to account for himself, enacted within
the authority of the then Revised Statute 2108,3 which provided
that a municipal council could ". . . provide for the punishment of
any vagrant, common street beggar, common prostitute, habitual
disturber of the peace . . . and any suspicious person who
cannot give a reasonable account of himself," was upheld, al-
though there were no specific acts of the defendant of which the
municipality could complain, on the reasoning that a general
course of conduct, or mode of life, which is prejudicial to the
public welfare may be prohibited and punished as an offense by
the municipality.
Although the General Assembly established a rather liberal
statutory framework within which the municipalities might adopt
* Louis B. Perillo was born in Salerno, Italy. He was graduated from
West Tech High School and has a Bachelor of Science degree from Case
Institute of Technology. He is a design engineer. Mr. Perillo is married
and the father of two children.
1 Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118 (1887); Townsend v.
City of Circleville, 78 Ohio St. 122 (1908); Cady v. Village of Barnesville,
4 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 101 (1878).
2 37 Ohio St. 23, 41 Am. Rep. 485 (1881).
3 General Code Sec. 3664, Revised Code Sec. 715.55.
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suitable peace-and-order measures,4 and although ordinances en-
acted thereunder were, in the main, given effect by the courts,5
the courts were reluctant to apply local penal ordinances, en-
acted thereunder, unless authority to enforce such provisions
were expressly granted or reasonableness of purpose were ap-
parent.6 In Jeffries v. Defiance7 and in In re Fitzsimmonss the
4 General Code Sec. 3658 (Revised Code Sec. 715.55):
"Any municipal corporation may prevent riot, gambling, noise and
disturbance, and indecent and disorderly conduct or assemblages, preserve
the peace and good order, and protect the property of the municipal cor-
poration and its inhabitants."
General Code Sec. 3659 (Revised Code Sec. 715.51):
"Any municipal corporation may: (A) Regulate billiard and pool
tables, nine or ten pin alleys; (B) Authorize the destruction of instruments
or devices used for the purpose of gambling."
General Code Sec. 3660 (Revised Code Sec. 715.52):
"Any municipal corporation may: (A) Suppress and restrain dis-
orderly houses and houses of ill-fame; (B) Provide for the punishment of all
lewd and lascivious behavior in the streets and other public places."
General Code Sec. 3662 (Revised Code Sec. 715.53):
"Any municipal corporation may regulate taverns and other houses
for public entertainment."
General Code Sec. 3663 (Revised Code Sec. 715.54):
"Any municipal corporation may restrain and prohibit the distribution,
sale and exposure for sale of books, papers, pictures, and periodicals or
advertising matters of an obscene or immoral nature."
General Code Sec. 3664 (Revised Code Sec. 715.55):
"Any municipal corporation may provide for: (A) The punishment of
persons disturbing the good order and quiet of the municipal corporation by
clamors and noises in the night season, by intoxication, drunkenness, fight-
ing, committing assault, assault and battery, using obscene or profane
language in the streets and other public places to the annoyance of the
citizens or otherwise violating the public peace by indecent or disorderly
conduct, or by lewd and lascivious behavior; (B) The punishment of any
vagrant, common street beggar, common prostitute, habitual disturber of the
peace, known pickpocket, gambler, burglar, thief, watch stuffer, ball game
player, a person who practices any trick, game, or device with intent to
swindle, a person who abuses his family, and any suspicious person who
cannot give a reasonable account of himself."
General Code Sec. 3628 (Revised Code Sec. 715.67):
"Any municipal corporation may make the violation of any of its ordi-
nances a misdemeanor, and provide for the punishment thereof by fine or
imprisonment, or both. The fine, imposed under authority of this section,
shall not exceed $500.00 and imprisonment shall not exceed six months."
5 Cleveland v. Lavelle, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 648, 51 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 310
(1906); Esch v. Elyria, 7 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 9, 17 Ohio C. Dec. 446 (1905);
Squires v. Wiener, 19 Ohio C. C. 736, 10 Ohio C. Dec. 293 (1899); Billington
v. Hoverman, 18 Ohio C. C. 637, 7 Ohio C. Dec. 358 (1897); Trimble v.
Village of Bucyrus, 9 Ohio Dec. 832, 5 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 15 (1880);
Bauer v. Avondale, 6 Ohio Dec. Repr. 706, 7 Am. L. Rec. (Ohio) 478, 7 Ohio
Dec. Repr. 577, 4 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 12 (1878); Morgan v. Nolte, supra,
note 2.
6 Glaser v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio Dec. 398, 31 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 243 (1893).
7 11 Ohio Dec. Repr. 144, 25 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 68 (1891).
8 13 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 104, 57 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 285 (1912).
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courts would not enforce village ordinances enacted under au-
thority of General Code Sec. 3664 for the offenses of "being in a
state of intoxication." Sec. 3664 provided that disorderly conduct
and the disturbing of the peace were subject to local enforce-
ment; and for the purpose of definition, indicated that a person
would be in violation of the ordinance when perpetrating such
misconduct while, among other things, in the state of intoxication.
Since Sec. 3664 did not empower the municipalities to enact ordi-
nances which made "being in a state of intoxication" in and of
itself an offense, such ordinance was void. Similarly in In re
Howard9 and in In re Dunlap o loitering, in itself, was found not
to constitute disorderly conduct within the purview of Sec. 3664,
and the local ordinances predicated thereon could not be en-
forced. In Cady v. Village of Barnesville," an ordinance pro-
hibiting any male person to associate with a known lewd female
was declared invalid as authority to adopt and enforce such an
ordinance was not conferred, expressly or impliedly, by statute.
Before passing out of the pre-1912 era it is interesting to
note the decisions on the question of the applicability of local
ordinances prohibiting certain acts which the General Assembly
had defined as crimes against the State and for which the General
Assembly had provided appropriate punishment. In a few of
the earlier cases12 it had been decided that the state and a
municipality could each provide for the punishment of the same
act and the jurisdiction to punish thereto was concurrent. In a
later case, Wellsville v. O'Conner,13 the court denied the validity
of an ordinance defining "assault and battery" as an offense
against the municipality declaring ". . . that the prohibition of
crimes and offenses lies within the domain of police power; that
the exercise of police power is an exclusive prerogative of the
state; that the municipal corporation has no inherent power to
enact by-laws or ordinances for the punishment of offenses; that
it has only such powers as are clearly and expressly conferred
upon it by the legislature, or must necessarily be implied in order
9 15 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 171, 23 Ohio C. Dec. 634 (1912).
10 13 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 325, 57 Week. L. Bull. (Ohio) 484 (1912).
11 Supra, note 1.
12 Koch v. State, 53 Ohio St. 433, 41 N. E. 689 (1895); Emery v. Elyria, 8
Ohio N. P. 208, 11 Ohio Dec. 316 (1899); Wightman v. State, 10 Ohio 452
(1841).
13 1 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 253, 14 Ohio C. Dec. 689 (1902).
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to carry into effect those expressly granted; that where the
legislature, by general law, has exercised its jurisdiction as to
punishment of an offense, there is a presumption of an intention
to make its jurisdiction over such subject exclusive; and that in
all cases where the grant is uncertain or doubtful the power
must be denied." 14
Because the legal incidents within a community increase as
the members of that community increase in number, and because
coextensive therewith, the ability of the legal processes to keep
pace with the legal incidents decreases, it is imperative, in the
interest of maintaining the proper order of things that the re-
sponsibility of applying the legal processes be invested in those
who would be most affected. In order to bring the need for the
laws and the making of the laws into practicable proximity, there
was born of the Ohio constitutional convention of 1912, and em-
bodied into the Ohio constitution, the home-rule amendment,
Art. XVIII, Sec. 3:
"Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of
local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regula-
tions, as are not in conflict with general laws."
By virtue of Art. XVIII, Sec. 3, each municipality received,
within specified limits, supreme authority to regulate its own
affairs to the extent necessary to prevent offenses and to pre-
serve the health, morals and safety of the public. Quite contrary
to the situation which existed prior to the adoption of Sec. 3, the
General Assembly was precluded from denying, delimiting or
delineating the municipalities' police powers.15
A rundown of the decisions in the years immediately follow-
ing the adoption of Sec. 3 shows that the statutes which thereto-
fore had been the basis of upholding ordinances whose purpose
14 In Koch v. State and Wightman v. State, supra note 12, the prosecution
was brought by the State of Ohio on an offense previously punished by
municipal ordinances, whereas in Wellsville v. O'Conner the action was by
the municipality under its ordinance.
15 Cincinnati v. Gamble, 138 Ohio St. 220, 20 Ohio Op. 273, 34 N. E. (2d) 226
(1941); Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 167 N. E. 158, 64 Am. L.
Rec. 981 (1929); Greenburg v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 282, 120 N. E. 829
(1918); Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468 (1917). The Keating case
recognized the application of the home-rule amendment to the extent that
it declared unconstitutional General Code Sec. 6307 which provided, among
other things, that the local authorities could not regulate the speed of motor
vehicles. The court reasoned that a state statute could not deny the local




it was to maintain the peace and good order were, in some meas-
ure, still relied upon by the courts. In In re Baldridge'1 the
validity of an anti-loitering ordinance was upheld on the basis of
General Code Sec. 3664 and in the Matter of Sherlock17 the
validity of an ordinance, making it unlawful to carry evidence of
wagering on horse races, was upheld on the basis of General Code
Sec. 3658. However in Welch v. Cleveland18 the court declared
as valid an "anti-loitering and suspicious persons" ordinance on
the proposition that the home-rule amendment gave to municipal
corporations no less than what they had under General Code
Sec. 3664. Similarly in Greenburg v. Cleveland19 the court de-
clared as valid an anti-pocketpicking ordinance, citing General
Code Sec. 3658 and Sec. 3664 as sources of authority, but stating
that even in the absence of such statutes, by virtue of Art. XVIII,
Sec. 3 of the Ohio Constitution, the power to enact such an ordi-
nance inhered in municipal corporations.
The Greenburg case must stand out-at least in the phase of
peace-and-order-as the first case in which the courts recog-
nized, in express terms, the superiority of the home-rule amend-
ment to General Code Sec. 3658 and Sec. 3664. The succeeding
cases on this subject have revealed a general tendency on the
part of the courts to interpret the home-rule amendment in the
broadest perspective. The validity of an ordinance enacted under
the authority of the home-rule amendment has been sustained
when each of two conditions prevails: (1) The ordinance has a
reasonable purpose and the means of effectuating that purpose is
not arbitrary; and (2) There is no conflict with general laws.
It is well-settled that this constitutionally-endowed power is not
to be used arbitrarily; and further, that such exercise of that
power must, in some substantial degree, tend to prevent offenses
or to preserve the health, morals or safety of the public. 20 That to
16 6 Ohio App. 76, 28 Ohio Ct. App. 353, 30 Ohio C. Dec. 156 (1915).
17 16 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 302 (1916).
is 97 Ohio St. 311, 313, 120 N. E. 206, 208 (1917). J. Wannamaker declared:
"If cities had the power under said Section 3664 (General Code) to declare
against loafing and loitering and any suspicious person who cannot give a
reasonable account of himself as the statute evidently declares, surely that
municipal power was not in any wise lessened by the grant in said Section 3
(Ohio Const. Art. XVIII). If a city has not such power, it lacks the very
first element of the preservation of public order, peace and government.
19 Supra, note 15.
20 Cincinnati v. Correll, 141 Ohio St. 535, 26 Ohio Op. 116, 49 N. E. (2d) 412
(1943).
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maintain the peace and good order falls within the indicated clas-
sification is readily apparent, and the courts have gone to great
lengths to give effect to municipal ordinances whose purposes
are to maintain peace and good order.
In the Greenburg case, pocketpicking by the defendant was
held to be in violation of a Cleveland ordinance defining as a
misdemeanor any attempt, other than by force or violence, to steal
from the person of another, anything of value. In response to
defendant's contention that the prohibition of crimes and of-
fenses was a function of the state, J. Donahue stated, "While
this proposition is fundamentally true, yet the exercise of this
power is of such vital importance to large centers of population
... that it is exercised by the state, at least to a limited degree,
through the agencies of municipalities. . " 1
In Kearney v. Cincinnati22 and in the very recent case of
Dayton v. Miller,23 ordinances defining the misdemeanor of as-
sault and battery were upheld notwithstanding that such of-
fenses were punishable by statute. In Meyers v. Cincinnati,24
the court upheld an ordinance making it unlawful to exhibit and
maintain slot machines. In Cleveland Heights v. Christie,25 the
court upheld a charge of violating an ordinance making it un-
lawful for one to conduct himself in a noisy, rude, boisterous, or
insulting manner toward any other person, where defendant
called a police officer "a bastard." In McCollum v. Cincinnati,2 6
an ordinance prohibiting the discharge of firearms was upheld
where defendant shot and killed a dog, which was engaged in a
fight with another dog, although by statute it appeared that the
dog could be killed lawfully.2 7 In Youngstown v. Aiello,2 the
court upheld a "suspicious persons" ordinance, reiterating the
21 98 Ohio St. 282, 283.
22 22 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 255, 29 Ohio Dec. 594 (1919).
23 154 Ohio St. 500, 43 Ohio Op. 433, 96 N. E. (2d) 780 (1951).
24 128 Ohio St. 235, 190 N. E. 569 (1934).
25 128 Ohio St. 297, 190 N. E. 770 (1934). Also see Cincinnati v. Schill, 125
Ohio St. 57 (1932).
26 51 Ohio App. 67, 4 Ohio Op. 49, 199 N. E. 603 (1935).
27 Ohio General Code Sec. 5838 provided: "A dog that chases, worries, in-
jures or kills a sheep, lamb, goat, kid, domestic fowl, domestic animal or
person, can be killed at any time or place .... "
28 156 Ohio St. 32, 45 Ohio Op. 45, 100 N. E. (2d) 62 (1951).
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dicta presented in two earlier cases; 29 although in Columbus v.
Aldrich,30 such an ordinance was invalid against one, of known
notoriety, who was charged with "loitering about a barroom"
where such loitering actually consisted of the defendant's con-
ferring with his attorney for a period of four minutes. In Solo-
mon v. Cleveland,3 1 an ordinance making it an offense to sell
newspapers or periodicals containing racing news and tips on
horse racing was declared to be a valid exercise of power within
the home-rule amendment. In the area of liquor regulation, both
during and after federal prohibition, regulations by local ordi-
nances, where there were no conflicts with state or federal pro-
visions, were held to be within the valid exercise of the munic-
ipalities' powers.3 2 In Shaker Heights v. Klein,33 it was ruled
that an ordinance requiring the daily registration of pickets was
an unreasonable restriction on the rights and freedoms granted
by the U. S. and Ohio Constitutions.
OHIO CONST. Art. XVIII, Sec. 3 endows the municipalities
with those powers of local self-government ".. . as are not in con-
flict with general laws." The courts have unanimously inter-
preted the general laws to be those laws which have been enacted
by the General Assembly. A question of conflict arises (1) where
the state and the municipality each have prohibited the same
act and where each seeks to enforce, independent of the other;
(2) where the municipality seeks to prohibit that which the
state permits, or seeks to permit that which the state prohibits;
and (3) where the municipality provides a penalty in excess of
that authorized by the state.
It is well-settled that the municipality may, by ordinance,
regulate the same acts as the state. The Attorney-General34
29 Morgan v. Nolte, supra, note 2 and Welch v. Cleveland, supra, note 18:
"The offense of being a suspicious person does not consist of particular acts,
but of the mode of life, the habits and practices of the accused in respect to
the character or traits which it is the object of the ordinance creating the
offense to suppress."
30 69 Ohio App. 396, 24 Ohio Op. 142, 42 N. E. (2d) 915 (1942).
31 26 Ohio App. 19, 159 N. E. 121 (1927).
32 Kaufman v. Paulding, 92 Ohio App. 169, 49 Ohio Op. 288 (1951); Akron
v. Scalera, 135 Ohio St. 65, 13 Ohio Op. 376, 19 N. E. (2d) 279 (1939);
Coshocton v. Suba, 55 Ohio App. 40, 8 Ohio Op. 345, 8 N. E. (2d) 572 (1936);
Lorain v. Petralia, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 159 (1929); Struthers v. Sokol, infra, note
40.
33 25 Ohio Op. 415, 9 Ohio Supp. 234 (1942).
34 Ops. Att'y Gen. (Ohio), Vol. H, P. 1539 (1919).
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makes the following comment: "The rule in Ohio seems to be
that municipalities, within the limits of the power granted to
them, may pass ordinances regulating the same acts as state
statutes have regulated so long as the said ordinance prescribes
a punishment which limits the offense to a misdemeanor. If a
city ordinance should prescribe such a punishment as would
result in placing the accused in jeopardy when being prosecuted
under said ordinance, this would defeat operation of the state
statute providing an offense for the same act and render said
ordinance invalid."
Where there is express conflict, that is, the municipality
permits that which the state prohibits, or prohibits that which
the state permits, there is without question "a conflict with
general laws" and the municipal ordinance must be of no effect.3 5
So that in Kaufman v. Paulding,36 that portion of a local ordi-
nance which prohibited the sale of beer on Sunday was void,
since by statute37 the State had permitted such sale; but that
portion of the local ordinance which prohibited the sale of in-
toxicating liquor on Sunday was valid as it did not conflict with
general laws. In Scioto Valley Dairy v. Dayton,38 a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the sale of confections and refreshments in
parks and certain other public places was found to be void as it
conflicted with General Code Sec. 3670 and Sec. 3672,3 9 and
further that the police power granted to municipalities included
the power to regulate but not the power to prohibit.
Where the conflict is one of penalties and not of substance,
the conflict is not resolved so easily. It is noted that Art. XVIII,
Sec. 3 provides that a municipality may adopt and enforce such
police regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. Does
a penalty constitute a police regulation, or is it merely a remedy,
and hence independent of the regulation? In Struthers v.
Sokol,40 this question was analyzed with respect to a local liquor
prohibition ordinance which provided a penalty in excess of that
35 See Dayton v. Miller, supra, note 23; Lorain v. Petralia, supra, note 32;
Struthers v. Sokol, infra, note 40; Greenburg v. Cleveland, supra, note 15;
Kearney v. Cincinnati, supra, note 22.
36 92 Ohio App. 169, 49 Ohio Op. 288 (1951).
37 General Code Sec. 6064-22 (Revised Code Sec. 4301.22).
38 88 Ohio App. 52 (1951).
39 Revised Code Sec. 715.61 and Sec. 715.63.
40 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N. E. 519 (1923).
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provided by a state statute on the same subject. In ruling that
differences in penalties between local ordinances and state
statutes upon the same offenses do not constitute conflicts in
general laws within the meaning of Art. XVIII, Sec. 3, C. J. Mar-
shall stated:41 "No real conflict can exist unless the ordinance
declares something to be right which the state declares to be
wrong, or vice versa. There can be no conflict unless one au-
thority grants a permit or license to do an act which is forbidden
or prohibited by the other."
With a single exception,4 2 the Ohio decisions have followed
the doctrine expounded in the Sokol case,43 namely that an ordi-
nance is not invalid because it provides for a penalty in excess of
that prescribed by statute for a similar offense or of that pre-
scribed by General Code Sec. 3628 which defines and describes
the limits to which a municipality may punish for the violation of
an ordinance.
41 Id. at 268.
42 In In re Brown, 29 Ohio L. Rep. 220 (1929), a Cleveland ordinance
which was identical to the Ohio-enacted Crabbe Act, prohibiting the sale
and use of intoxicating liquors, was declared void because the penalty
provided thereunder exceeded the maximum penalty established by Gen-
eral Code Sec. 3628.
43 In re Calhoun, 87 Ohio App. 193, 42 Ohio Op. 401, 94 N. E. (2d) 388(1949); Kistler v. Warren, 58 Ohio App. 531, 16 N. E. (2d) 948 (1937);
Leipsic v. Folk, 38 Ohio App. 177, 176 N. E. 95, 34 Ohio L. Rep. 312 (1931).
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